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ABSTRACT 
In the wake of American involvement in the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, it is important 
to reevaluate Civil Affairs (CA), including the education and training of its personnel for 
future missions and conflicts. What role can CA play as an influencing force to mitigate 
conflict in phase 0 “shaping” operations? Can CA have a greater role at the operational 
and strategic levels? More importantly, does the force have the right training and 
education to meet these future challenges? 
This capstone argues that the notion of a solely post-conflict reconstruction 
mission of CA is outdated and needs to be adapted to meet modern, pre-conflict, shaping 
requirements. Specifically, 1) CA is better suited to acting as an influencing force, 2) an 
educated, experienced, and credentialed force is necessary to maximize effectiveness and 
influence, and 3) a new career path for CA officers is required to maximize the influence 
and skills of CA’s most talented officers. To reach these goals, this capstone charts a 
course for CA to break out of the tactical realm and creates a path that will link CA 
knowledge and expertise to policy, strategy, and operations. 
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Civil Affairs (CA) is the youngest active duty branch in the United States (U.S.) 
Army, officially receiving this designation in 2006. However, the mission and its soldiers 
have existed for decades. The traditional mission of CA is as a “clean-up crew” after 
large-scale conflicts. For example, in World War II, CA soldiers laid the groundwork for 
the robust Marshall Plan, and the equally impressive reconstruction effort in Japan.1 
While this is an important legacy, some distinct differences exist between post-World 
War II efforts and operations today. First, the WWII allies achieved total victory both 
militarily and politically. Second, both Germany and Japan were receptive to the plans 
and were mostly willing participants in the efforts. Third, both countries were mature 
nations with functioning institutions prior to their defeat, which made restoration easier 
than having to establish and gain acceptance for new political, economic, and social 
systems.2 
According to Grimes, over the last 10-plus years, the wars in Iraq and 
Afghanistan have eroded CA effectiveness as other governmental agencies participated in 
typical CA missions under the “whole of government approach,” and thus, confused the 
perceived role and proper employment of CA.3 Instead of including CA in the planning 
and execution of the long term stability, development and influence programs, much of 
the active CA focus was limited to the tactical level crisis response and stabilization 
efforts. As modern conflicts continue, it is important to reevaluate the role of CA, its 
education and training, and its personnel for future missions and conflicts; specifically, 
expanding the role of CA beyond that of a phase 4 “cleanup crew.” What role can CA 
play as an influencing force to mitigate conflict in phase 0 “shaping” operations? Can CA 
                                                 
1 U.S. Department of State, Office of the Historian, “Milestones: 1945–1952,” November 15, 2013, 
http://history.state.gov/milestones/1945-1952/japan-reconstruction.  
2 Rolf Wagner, “Virtual Victory” The Influence of “Post” Modern Warfare on Post Conflict 
Operations: Is Defeat Necessary to Start “Phase IV (Fort Leavenworth: KS: United States Army 
Command and General Staff College, 2004). 
3 Gregory Grimes, “Civil Affairs: Gathering the Reins,” Small Wars Journal, March 23, 2009. 
http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/2009/03/civil-affairs- gathering-the-re/. 
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have a greater role at the operational and strategic levels? More importantly, does the 
force have the right training and education to meet these future challenges? 
This capstone argues that the notion of a solely post-conflict reconstruction4 
mission of CA is outdated and needs to be adapted to meet modern, pre-conflict, shaping 
requirements. Specifically, 1) CA is better leveraged as an influencing force in phase 0, 
as well as a synchronizing and facilitating force during the whole of government stability 
efforts in phase 4 and phase 5, transition to civil authority, 2) an educated, experienced, 
and credentialed force is necessary to maximize effectiveness and influence, 3) the 
current career path for active duty officers focuses only on the tactical level and does not 
take advantage of experience and knowledge to develop officers at the operational and 
strategic level, and 4) the path to the rank of colonel is limited, which can curtail the 
capability to maximizing the influence and skills of CA’s most talented officers. To reach 
these goals, this capstone charts a course for CA to break out of the tactical realm and 
creates a path that will link CA knowledge and expertise to policy, strategy, and 
operations.  
The purpose of this capstone is to increase the capability of CA officers and to 
examine an alternate path to senior ranks that capitalizes on the knowledge and expertise 
of CA. The proposed alternate career path would allow CA officers to gain additional 
education, skills, experience, and authority to better influence foreign populations and 
inform U.S. military strategy at the strategic level. This approach will better realize 
Special Operations Forces (SOF) truths.  
SOF Truth One: Humans are more important than hardware. People—not 
equipment—make the critical difference. The right people, highly trained 
and working as a team, will accomplish the mission with the equipment 
                                                 
4 “Post-conflict reconstruction is broadly understood as a complex, holistic and multidimensional 
process encompassing effort to simultaneously improve military (restoration of law and order), political 
(governance), economic (rehabilitation and development) and social conditions (justice and 
reconciliation).” Nikolaos Tzifakis “Post Conflict Economic Reconstruction,” Encyclopedia 
Princetoniensis, The Princeton Encyclopedia of Self-Determination, accessed June 11, 2014, 
http://pesd.princeton.edu/?q=node/260.  
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available. On the other hand, the best equipment in the world cannot 
compensate for a lack of the right people.5 
This capstone will demonstrate that selecting the right people, with advanced 
education, credentials, higher-level military professional education, and added training 
will exponentially increase the capability of CA. This proposed approach focuses on an 
investment in human capital from which the Army, USSOCOM and the U.S. government 
will see future returns. 
SOF Truth Two: Quality is better than quantity. A small number of 
people, carefully selected, well trained, and well led, are preferable to 
larger numbers of troops, some of whom may not be up to the task.6 
Officers selected to be CA specialists will undergo multiple screenings and 
educational hurdles to acquire the appropriate level of education and credentials. These 
individuals cannot be produced in mass but rather with a focus of quality. 
SOF Truth Three: Special Operations Forces cannot be mass-produced. It 
takes years to train operational units to the level of proficiency needed to 
accomplish difficult and specialized SOF missions. Intense training – both 
in SOF schools and units – is required to integrate competent individuals 
into fully capable units. This process cannot be hastened without 
degrading ultimate capability.7 
The training and education proposed for an alternate CA career path requires 10 
to 15 years to reach the ultimate capability and maximize the influence of those positions. 
An alternate path focusing on a blend of education and operational experience will better 
integrate CA operations with operational and strategic objectives. 
SOF Truth Four: Competent Special Operations Forces cannot be created 
after emergencies occur. Creation of competent, fully mission capable 
units takes time. Employment of fully capable special operations 
capability on short notice requires highly trained and constantly available 
SOF units in peacetime.8  
                                                 






The investment of this capstone proposes is for a capable force within five years 
and a functioning influencing force in 10 years. 
This project examines the history of CA from WWII to the present, and 
specifically focuses on the training and education of these forces in relation to their 
assigned mission in Chapter II. Chapter III argues that the future of CA lies within 
influence operations; the chapter therefore provides a brief overview of influence and 
how CA can work as an influencing force. Chapter IV aligns with ARSOF 2022, which 
asserts that a force with “the ability to assess and understand a situation from multiple 
points of view and to intuitively adapt operations as necessary requires mature soldiers 
who have the ability to combine their education and experience to solve a problem.”9 
Specifically, the chapter contends that, through education and experience, CA officers 
would be better prepared to fulfill their role not just as an influencing force at the tactical 
level but also at operational and strategic commands. Chapter V proposes an alternative 
career path that allows for education, experience, and credentialing—necessary 
ingredients for building a more capable CA officer. Chapter VI offers concluding 
thoughts. Additionally, the Appendix provides a curriculum designed to educate CA 
captains better. This proposed curriculum is currently under review at the John F. 
Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School, the schoolhouse responsible for training 
CA soldiers.  
                                                 
9 United States Army John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School, Office of Strategic 
Communication, ARSOF 2022 (Fort Bragg, NC: United States Army John F. Kennedy Special Warfare 
Center and School, 2013), 9. 
 5 
II. CIVIL AFFAIRS FROM WORLD WAR II TO THE PRESENT 
A. INTRODUCTION 
From westward expansion of the United States and the Mexican-American War to 
the Civil War to current operations in Afghanistan, the U.S. Army has conducted civil-
military operations as a means toward achieving military ends. However, it was not until 
the mid-20th century that the Army identified and attempted to mend the capability gap 
of dedicated and trained personnel for civil-military operations.  
This chapter outlines the advent of CA as an occupational specialty, beginning 
with Word War II, and offers a brief overview of the varied uses of CA forces in military 
conflicts. Overall, this chapter finds that the U.S. Government and military have 
employed CA in an ad hoc fashion ranging from a post-conflict stabilization force to 
shaping and influencing early conflict environments. This chapter demonstrates that the 
U.S. Government and military need to develop a forward thinking strategy of how to 
employ CA in a range of environments to better utilize this unique force. 
B. WORLD WAR II AND CIVIL AFFAIRS 
Three months before the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor, a U.S. Army lawyer 
from the Judge Advocate General Division, Colonel Harry Auer, proposed advanced 
governance training for select military officers in a letter to the Army G-1’s office. 
American forces are now serving in a number of bases in foreign 
countries, which service involves difficult and delicate questions arising 
from relations with the local government; and there is a possibility of 
future service involving the administration of military government by the 
United States Army. These facts indicate the need of competent personnel 
for such duties. Their detail from combatant units will deplete the officer 
strength of such units, and officers so detailed will in most cases be 
inexperienced and untrained in such duties.10 
By early 1942, the Army’s Provost Marshal General had been assigned the 
responsibility of training military officers in CA and military government (MG), as well 
                                                 
10 Harry L. Coles and Albert K. Weinberg, Civil Affairs: Soldiers Become Governors (Washington, 
DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1964), 8. 
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as establishing a School of Military Government.11 For the first time, the U.S. military 
made a decided effort to train military officers effectively for the purpose of CA. 
Wanting to keep the school near the Army War College and the national capital region, 
the Provost Marshal General accepted an offer to house the school at the University of 
Virginia. The first MG/CA course, of 60 students, ran from May–August of 1942 and 
included classes, such as international law, political theory, public administration, and 
America’s history in MG.12 
The government’s use of just one school, however, limited the ability to train a 
sufficient number of military officers to assist in post-World War II governance. 
Therefore, the government recruited other universities to serve as CA training schools, 
including Yale, Harvard, Princeton, Stanford, the University of Michigan, the University 
of Chicago, Boston University, the University of Wisconsin, Western Reserve College, 
and the University of Pittsburgh.13 As with the initial course at the University of Virginia, 
these programs were destined to educate officers in governance and cultural facets for 
stabilization and post-conflict reconstruction.14  
Despite the increased number of programs available to the fledgling CA 
community, commanders were reluctant to send top-performers for risk of losing them 
from their ranks.15 To mitigate this concern, the Army directly commissioned educated 
and experienced civilians for the purpose of reconstruction and stabilization, in addition 
to incorporating civilian agencies to help with the reconstruction and governance efforts 
in post-World War II Germany.16 As reports from the field provided feedback to the 
                                                 
11 Coles and Weinberg, Civil Affairs: Soldiers Become Governors, 10. 
12 Ibid., 12. 
13 Charles S. Hyneman, “The Army’s Civil Affairs Training Program,” The American Political 
Science Review 38, no. 2 (1944): 343. 
14 Coles and Weinberg, Civil Affairs: Soldiers Become Governors, 17. 
15 Earl F. Ziemke, The U.S. Army in the Occupation of Germany: 1944–1946 (Washington, DC: U.S. 
Government Printing Office, 1975), 14. 
16 Rebecca Patterson, Revisiting a School of Military Government: How Reanimating a World War II-
Era Institution Could Professionalize Military Nation Building (Kansas City, MO: Ewing Marion 
Kauffman Foundation, 2011), 9. 
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program, the curriculum of the MG courses evolved, specifically with the addition of 
intense language training.17 
U.S. Operations in North Africa in 1942 served as the initial test of a civilian-led 
stability and reconstruction effort in militarily controlled areas. This effort was conducted 
parallel to military operations; however, they lacked coordination, and ultimately, proved 
insufficient. Tucker and Lamb note, “By November 1943, the president had changed his 
mind and acknowledged that if civil affairs, particularly the distribution of relief supplies, 
were to be handled efficiently and effectively, the military would have to do it.”18  
Following the lessons in North Africa, efforts to stabilize Europe began in 1943 
when officers in Europe, including CA officers, assumed the duties of local or regional 
civic administrators. The officers were first educated in various aspects of governance 
stateside and then grouped into detachments according to the specific area’s population 
and civic needs.19 In liberated areas, the ability of the local authorities to function as a 
government determined the degree of military control. In enemy territory, however, 
military governors administered the whole spectrum of governmental affairs.20 
The term “military government” was a source of discomfort for both the military 
and civilian authorities from the beginning. Military leadership believed governance was 
outside their purview and the civilian leaders in the U.S. Government thought the term 
evoked proconsuls and imperialism.21 Ziemke notes, “Although the Army Schools turned 
out over 6,000 trained civil affairs officers and the MG in Germany alone required 15,000 
trained soldiers in the first months after V-E day, the concept of CA as a predominantly 
civil function persisted.”22 After multiple rounds of contentious talks between military 
                                                 
17 Joseph P. Harris, “Selection and Training of Civil Affairs Officers,” Public Opinion Quarterly 7, 
no. 4, The Occupation of Enemy Territory (Winter 1943): 700. 
18 David Tucker and Christopher Lamb, United States Special Operations Forces (New York: 
Columbia University Press, 2007), 76.  
19 Ziemke, The U.S. Army in the Occupation of Germany: 1944–1946, 63. 
20 Ibid., 70. 
21 Stanley Sandler, Glad to See Them Come and Sorry to See Them Go: A History of U.S. Army Civil 
Affairs and Military Government, 1775–1991 (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1994), 
168. 
22 Earl F. Ziemke, “Civil Affairs Reaches Thirty,” Military Affairs 36, no. 4 (1972): 133. 
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and civilian leaders throughout the executive branch, Sandler states, “President Roosevelt 
informed the War Department that the Army would have to assume the initial burden of 
CA/MG, but added significantly that civilian agencies would carry out the long range 
program.23 The Office of Military Government continuously reiterated its efforts as 
secondary to a civilian-led post-war reconstruction, and insisted that military governors 
serve as administrators and not statesman.24 
By mid-1945, nearly all German government units below the national level were 
staffed and run by German officials.25 The efforts of American CA/MG officers 
undoubtedly assisted in setting the stage for the European Recovery Program (Marshall 
Plan) following the conflict. Despite their successes, the CA and MG staff positions in 
the Army were dissolved in 1949. The CA force was largely relegated to the reserves in 
which practitioners would cultivate their specialties with experience from civilian life. 
Only a small number of active CA units remained; one of which, the 95th CA Group, was 
reactivated at Fort Bragg, NC on October 29, 1948. This unit provided the Army with a 
rapidly deployable civil affairs unit, if and when, the need arose.26 
C. THE KOREAN WAR 
The American occupation of South Korea from 1945–1948 presented new 
challenges for the U.S. Army’s MG and CA forces. After being ruled by Japan from 
1910–1945, the Allies questioned Korea’s ability to self-govern after the surrender of 
Japan. Korea was freed of the Japanese only to be divided by the Allies after World War 
II; the United States occupied the south and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics 
(USSR) occupied the north.27 The previous Japanese occupation left very few Koreans 
                                                 
23 Sandler, Glad to See Them Come and Sorry to See Them Go: A History of U.S. Army Civil Affairs 
and Military Government, 1775–1991, 174. 
24 Ziemke, The U.S. Army in the Occupation of Germany: 1944–1946, 21; Sandler, Glad to See Them 
Come and Sorry to See Them Go: A History of U.S. Army Civil Affairs and Military Government, 1775–
1991, 172. 
25 Harold Zink, “American Military Government Organization in Germany,” The Journal of Politics 8, 
no. 3 (1946): 346. 
26 Sandler, Glad to See Them Come and Sorry to See Them Go: A History of U.S. Army Civil Affairs 
and Military Government, 1775–1991, 337. 
27 Jürgen Kleiner, Korea: A Century of Change (River Edge, NJ: World Scientific, 2001), 49. 
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with the skills to govern or lead industry. Due to the shortage of qualified Koreans and 
U.S. MG-trained officers, the United States initially left many former Japanese 
administrators in power, a decision that infuriated the population.28 In 1945, the U.S. 
Government established the U.S. Army Military Government in Korea as an initial step 
toward empowering the Korean government toward self-rule.29 To expedite the removal 
of Japanese influence from Korea, U.S. MG leaders eliminated the Japanese-led Bureau 
of Police and replaced it with a Korean police agency.30 Similar steps were taken 
throughout the Korean government during the American occupation to slowly enable the 
Koreans to self-govern. However, despite the efforts of U.S. Army Forces in Korea, post-
World War II CA efforts were largely neglected in Korea, while the main efforts at 
reconstruction and democratization focused on Europe and Japan. Kleiner summarizes, 
“when the Americans arrived at Inchon, they had no knowledge about Korea, not to 
mention plans and ideas on how to govern the country.”31 
In the months following the 1950 invasion by North Korea, the requirements for 
the U.S. Army’s MG functions shifted to conducting CA in support of an internationally 
recognized Korean government rather than the establishment of a MG.32 The American 
occupation of South Korea from 1945–1948 initially hindered the United Nations (UN) 
command’s efforts to conduct CA and humanitarian assistance during the early stages of 
the conflict with North Korea.33 The difficult transition to civilian rule after the end of 
World War II made any mention of MG or similar assistance by outside forces difficult 
for the Koreans to accept.  
                                                 
28 James Schnabel, Policy and Direction: The First Year (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing 
Office, 1992), 19. 
29 James Matray, “Hodge Podge: American Occupation Policy in Korea, 1945–1948,” Korean Studies, 
19 (1995): 22. 
30 Robert K. Sawyer, Military Advisors in Korea: KMAG in Peace and War (Washington, DC: U.S. 
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Once engaged, the most notable accomplishment of CA forces in Korea during 
the conflict was their contribution to relocating refugees and internally displaced people 
fleeing the conflict-affected areas.34 In addition, U.S. headquarters positioned CA forces 
to provide civil relief to the population as the command realized civil unrest might 
adversely affect military operations.35 A 1952 report, “CA in Korea,” by Johns Hopkins 
University identified that the quality of officers assigned for CA in Korea was not 
commensurate with the importance of the task.36 Sandler further notes, “Whatever its 
failings, Civil Affairs/Civic Assistance programs did make it possible for the U.S. Army 
and the UN command, after the first months of the war, to conduct operations with 
minimal interference from the Korean civilian population. In some significant ways it left 
the Republic actually in better condition than it was before the war.”37 
Two years after U.S. direct involvement in the Korean War, General Order No. 37 
established the Office of the Chief, Civil Affairs and Military Government in the Office 
of the Army Chief of Staff in April 1953.38 At the end of the war in 1955, the Department 
of the Army established the U.S. Army Reserve Civil Affairs/Military Government 
(officer) branch.39 By October 2, 1959, the Army had dropped the term MG and re-
designated the occupational specialty as the Civil Affairs Branch.40 The name change 
reflected the growing political sensitivities of MG, and the intent not to become 
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accessed January 16, 2014, http://www.archives.gov/research/guide-fed-records/groups/319.html#319, 5. 
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embroiled in large-scale nation building under Eisenhower’s New Look policy 
(containment of Soviet influence and strategic nuclear deterrence).41 
D. CIVIL AFFAIRS IN VIETNAM 
Army CA first deployed to the Republic of Vietnam in 1960 in response to the 
ongoing insurgency. President Kennedy’s interest in counterinsurgency revived the CA 
role, and by 1961, the U.S. Military Assistance Program formally included civic action as 
one of its tasks.42 For a short time, civic action and CA enjoyed a brief renaissance as 
military and civilian theorists followed the direction of the Kennedy administration.43 CA 
missions in Vietnam had three primary objectives: one, eliminate the Viet Cong (VC) 
Insurgency in South Vietnam; two, end the VC’s ability to recruit in Southern Vietnam, 
and three, recruit indigenous tribes to take up arms against the VC and the National 
Liberation Front (NLF).44 Beginning in 1967, Robert Komer coordinated these actions 
under the civil operations and revolutionary development support (CORDS) program, an 
interagency undertaking.45 The CORDS program coordinated military and civilian 
personnel towards the pacification of the population in the south through provincial, 
district, and village-level advisory teams.46 
In Vietnam, CA met opposition similar to that experienced in World War II over 
the stigma of MG. Sandler notes: 
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When, for example, the Deputy Chief of Staff for Special Operations, 
LTG Ray Peers, proposed the introduction of CA teams to assist in 
pacification at the province level, the U.S. Ambassador, Retired General 
Maxwell Taylor, successfully protested to the White House these “plans to 
impose U.S. military government,” wanting to know why the civilian 
agency personnel would be replaced with the “Army civil affairs types 
operating on a pattern of military occupation?” According to General 
Peers later, here was lost a “golden opportunity” to cause “a critical 
review of the organization for pacification in South Vietnam.”47 
In 1965, General Westmoreland decreed Army CA involvement would be limited to 
tactical operations.48 Lack of understanding of the mission and capabilities of CA forces 
led to their misuse and limited success. Many tactical commanders viewed the CA 
platoons as what they termed “goody passers,” and they lacked the knowledge or training 
to leverage CA operations, actions, and activities toward operational objectives.49 
After Vietnam, the Civil Affairs School was moved to Fort Bragg as part of the 
Institute for Military Assistance in 1972, later to become part of the John F. Kennedy 
Special Warfare Center and School. The Nunn Cohen amendment of 1986 (Public Law 
99–661) specifies CA among other specialties as a special operations function. These 
policies, in other words, moved CA from the conventional force and nested these 
activities with other irregular and unconventional forces.50  
E. PANAMA AND GRENADA 
The 1983 Operation Urgent Fury in Grenada and 1989 Operation Just Cause in 
Panama began to frame the modern paradigm of CA as a force that could create a bridge 
from conflict to stability. Although no formal CA plan was written for Operation Urgent 
Fury in Grenada51, reserve CA officers drafted a plan for post-conflict stability entitled 
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BLIND LOGIC in support of Operation Just Cause. BLIND LOGIC outlined actions the 
planners estimated would be necessary to restore order, although it was not written in 
conjunction with the ad hoc operational plan. The civilian-like stability tasks written in 
BLIND LOGIC kept the staff from sending it through the proper authorization channels 
to the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and according to Donnelly et al., led the combatant 
commander to focus solely on the tactical plan52 until combat operations were largely 
complete.53 As such, the CA planning and preparation in BLIND LOGIC were not 
integrated with the combat operations of the joint task force. 
In both Panama and Grenada, the active and reserve CA forces were called upon, 
during and after combat operations, to stabilize the afflicted areas and restore daily life to 
a functional level within the government and society. In these military actions, although 
CA sought to synchronize efforts with the State Department, United States Agency for 
International Development (USAID) and international organizations, the coordination did 
not adequately occur before the conflict and rather occurred ad hoc in the aftermath of the 
operation. These operations illustrate the lack of CA inclusion in prior planning, the 
desire of commanders not to become involved in a civilian reconstruction function, and 
the lack of military preparation for post-conflict activities.  
F. OPERATION IRAQI FREEDOM AND OPERATION ENDURING 
FREEDOM 
Operation Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan and Operation Iraqi Freedom were 
large-scale wars that illustrated the need for pre-planning for civil-military operations and 
stabilization. Within a few short weeks, coalition forces controlled Kabul54 and 
Baghdad.55 However, despite taking the capitals, these conflicts were far from over and 
quickly transitioned from conventional war to irregular conflict that required greater 
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attention to the population as part of the overall strategy. In 2005, Department of Defense 
Directive (DODD) 3000.05 identified stability operations as a core mission for the U.S. 
military and directed the military to train for stabilization activities with equal importance 
as combat operations.56 This stance was a significant policy shift toward the 
legitimization of CA and the professionalization of civil-military operations. 
Throughout his time in office, President Bush maintained that, “conditions on the 
ground will dictate our troop levels,”57 and ultimately, U.S. commitment. For senior 
military commanders, demonstrating the necessity of the troop levels to Congress 
required measured and quantitative indicators of progress, what General Petraeus referred 
to as “battlefield geometry.”58 The onus was on military units to demonstrate quantitative 
progress and overall effectiveness from the strategic to the tactical levels; as a result, 
these metrics eventually dominated reporting and progress of the war.59  
Until 2007, only one active duty CA battalion existed to support missions in 
Afghanistan and Iraq. To mitigate this capability gap, the military dedicated additional 
assets to stabilization; in some cases, entire units were directed to operate in support of 
civil-military operations.60 The lack of professionals, military or otherwise,61 with the 
capability of planning and executing these types of operations led to simple metrics that, 
in most cases, did not account for the complexity of the irregular environment.62 
Measures of performance, such as the number of security forces trained, number of 
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schools built, or miles of road improved, were used to represent significant steps toward a 
stable state. Similarly, the number of dollars spent represented an easy metric and led the 
Army Center for Lessons Learned to publish “The Commander’s Guide to Money as a 
Weapons System (MAAWS).” MAAWS explains, “Money is one of the primary 
weapons used by warfighters to achieve successful mission results in COIN and 
humanitarian operations.”63 The handbook provides a broad overview for satisfying 
various legal and staffing requirements for the use of funds in the counterinsurgency 
efforts in Iraq and Afghanistan, but it does not provide instruction in developing targeted 
and sustainable programs toward strategic ends where effectiveness can only be 
measured over time.  
Furthermore, civil-military efforts of maneuver units were seldom linked to CA 
elements in the area or the civilian stabilization strategy of the region.64 Units were 
responsible and rewarded for the amount of money spent or projects implemented in their 
assigned area of responsibility (AOR), not in the effects they achieved. These conditions 
led to multiple U.S. Government Accountability Office reports indicating U.S. 
stabilization efforts lack, “clear purpose, scope, roles and performance measures.”65 
In 2006, the Department of the Army General Order Number 12 reassigned 
reserve CA as a conventional force under U.S. Army Reserve Command while keeping 
active duty CA as a special operations force under U.S. Army Special Operations 
Command.66 Despite the fact that CA were the most deployed force in U.S. Special 
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Operations Command,67 the reassignment left a single CA battalion on active duty.68 
Additionally, splitting the force created a cultural schism between the two bodies of the 
branch.69 Reserve CA units, who were once special operations forces with access to the 
requisite SOF funding, Major Force Program 11 funds, were now subject solely to Army 
Reserve funding and force projection processes.70 This reallocation left the reserve forces 
with significantly fewer resources toward specialized training than their active duty 
counterparts.  
In response to the increased importance of CA in stability operations, the 95th 
Civil Affairs Brigade activated in 2007, along with the sequential activation of five 
additional active duty CA battalions over the next five years.71 Three active duty CA 
battalions were activated and available for the Iraq surge in 2008, but by and large, these 
additional units were created too late to significantly affect the stabilization efforts in 
Iraq.  
The recognized need for a military CA capability prompted the House Armed 
Services Committee to direct the Secretary of Defense to study and report on the roles 
and requirements of CA throughout the spectrum of operations.72 The Office of Secretary 
of Defense contracted the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) to 
examine the future of U.S. CA forces.73 CSIS concluded the need for the DOD to 
recognize CA and civil military operations (CMO) as vital to the success of military 
operations through well-trained and resourced CA professionals at all levels of the 
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Department of Defense (DOD) and U.S. Government.74 Additionally, the report 
highlights the absence of CA senior officers and advocates at the highest levels of the 
DOD.75  
G. CIVIL AFFAIRS FORCE STRUCTURE 
Prior to 2006, CA in the active force was a functional area. In other words, 
officers after eight years of service in their basic branch could apply to transfer into the 
career field, while non-commissioned officers (NCOs) in a CA unit came primarily from 
Special Forces (SF) units. In the reserve force, soldiers had the ability to select CA as 
their accessions branch, or their initial military occupational specialty (MOS). In October 
2006, CA became an active duty Army branch, which allowed active duty officers in the 
grade of captain or specialist for the enlisted ranks to apply for selection as a CA soldier. 
Alongside these changes, the U.S. military created a more robust definition of 
CA. Joint Publication 3-57, Civil Military Operations, defines CA operations as activities 
performed or supported by CA that did the following. 
 Enhance the relationship between military forces and civil authorities in 
areas in which military forces are present 
 Require coordination with other government agencies (OGAs), 
international governmental organizations (IGOs), non-governmental 
organizations (NGOs), indigenous populations and institutions (IPIs), and 
the private sector 
 Involve the application of CA functional specialty skills in areas normally 
the responsibility of civil government to enhance conduct of CMO. Use of 
dedicated CA and the conduct of Civil Affairs Operations (CAO) will 
enhance planned CMO by helping to ensure civil or indigenous 
understanding of, and compliance with, controls, regulations, directives, or 
other measures taken by commanders to accomplish the military mission 
and attain U.S. objectives. 
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 CAO are distinguishable [sic] from CMO insofar as the former are 
characterized by applications of functional specialties in areas normally 
the responsibility of indigenous government or civil authority. CMO may 
extend to the assumption of governmental functions required in an 
occupied territory during, or immediately subsequent, to hostilities.76 
The development of the mission and capabilities of U.S. Army CA forces led to 
the five CA core tasks as outlined in U.S. Army Field Manual 3-57 Civil Affairs 
Operations. 
Populace and Resources Control 
Populace control provides security for the populace, mobilizes human 
resources, denies enemy access to the population, and detects and reduces 
the effectiveness of enemy agents. 
Resources controls regulate the movement or consumption of material 
resources, mobilize materiel resources, and deny materiel to the enemy. 
Foreign Humanitarian Assistance  
FHA are programs conducted to relieve or reduce the results of natural or 
man-made disasters or other endemic conditions, such as human pain, 
disease, hunger, or need that might present a serious threat to life or that 
can result in great damage to or loss of property.  
Civil Information Management 
CIM is the process whereby civil information is collected, entered into a 
central database, and internally fused with the supported element, higher 
HQ, and other USG and DOD agencies, IGOs, and NGOs. This process 
ensures the timely availability of information for analysis and the widest 
possible dissemination of the raw and analyzed civil information to 
military and nonmilitary partners throughout the AO.  
Nation Assistance 
NA is civil or military assistance (other than FHA) rendered to a nation by 
U.S. forces within that nation’s territory during peacetime, crises or 
emergencies, or war based on agreements mutually concluded between the 
United States and that nation. NA operations support a HN by promoting 
sustainable development and growth of responsive institutions. The goal is 
to promote long-term regional stability. 
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Support to Civil Administration 
SCA are military operations that help to stabilize or to continue the 
operations of the governing body or civil structure of a foreign country, 
whether by assisting an established government or by establishing military 
authority over an occupied population.77 
To execute these missions, the CA force was divided into two active duty CA 
brigades in 2011 led by Army colonels, the 85th and 95th CA brigades, and one CA 
command in the Army Reserve led by a major general, U.S. Army Civil Affairs and 
Psychological Operations Command. In addition to these units, two USAR brigades exist 
under operational control of U.S. Army Europe and U.S. Army Pacific, the 361st and 
322nd CA brigades, respectively, each commanded by reserve Army colonels. See Figure 
1.  
 
Figure 1.  CA Force Structure78 
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CA is a rarity among Army MOS because a preponderance of the force and a vast 
majority of the senior leaders are in the reserve component. All but one general officer, 
an active brigadier general, are reserve officers. Furthermore, CA consists of three 
distinct command structures: the 95th CA BDE (A) that supports U.S. Army Special 
Operations Command and U.S. Special Operations Command, USACAPOC (A) that 
supports U.S. Army Reserve Command, and the 85th Civil Affairs Brigade assigned as a 
direct reporting unit to U.S. Army Forces Command. See Figure 1.  
In addition to the varied supported commands, CA has different training 
requirements and expectations for active and reserve officers, as well as for soldiers and 
NCOs. Active duty officers and NCOs complete a 42-week course of instruction at the 
U.S. Army John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School.79 This training includes 
language instruction, as well as cultural training in support of future regional alignment. 
Reserve officers attend a 29-day resident course preceded by online training. The reserve 
CA officers’ course does not include language or regionally focused training.80 Reserve 
NCOs complete part of their professional military education under the Army Reserve at 
Fort Dix, NJ or Fort Hunter-Liggett, CA.81 In sum, these parallel institutions within CA 
have, in effect, created three distinct forces. 
Furthermore, the table of organization and equipment for the reserve CA unit 
differs drastically from the active CA units. A reserve unit consists of six broad 
categories of CA functional specialty areas: rule of law, economic stability, governance, 
public health and welfare, infrastructure, and public education and information.82 The 
expertise for these specialties is to be obtained and cultivated in the reserve CA soldier’s 
civilian occupation. The locations of the various reserve CA elements across the United 
States, Europe, and Puerto Rico allow these units to draw upon the varied professional 
experience, education, and cultural nuances found throughout a diverse cross section of 
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American society. See Figures 2 and 3. In effect, reserve CA have the ability to deploy 
temporarily individuals or elements with unique capabilities not found in the active force. 
 
Figure 2.  U.S. Army Reserve CA Functional Specialties83 
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Figure 3.  U.S. Army Reserve CA Units and Locations84 
H. CONCLUSION 
This chapter has asserted that, instead of proactively setting the agenda for CA 
employment, CA has not been executed based on the recommendations of trained CA 
planners but rather in reaction to or as an afterthought of military operations. The 
sentiment of CA as “goody-passers” seems to permeate American conflict planning and 
execution from the official advent of CA in 1942 to Afghanistan in 2001 and Iraq in 
2003, although the expectations and role of the force have evolved with each conflict. 
During World War II, CA soldiers served in a variety of roles, including government 
administrators, responsible for the day-to-day operations of national, regional, and local 
levels of governance. In the Korean War, CA was used to evacuate refugees and fleeing 
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civilians, stabilize afflicted areas, and begin the reconstruction process for the Republic 
of Korea. In Vietnam, CA, in conjunction with other SOF, acted as a force of influence in 
the defense of the south, in addition to performing the role of a stabilizing and 
reconstruction force.  
Despite the varying roles that CA has played, common through each military 
action, however, was the reticence of military commanders to plan for and properly 
employ CA forces, while the civilian leaders objected to the use of soldiers in what they 
view as clearly a civilian function. The demand for and expectations of CA forces have 
increased in the contemporary operating environment, although the parallel command 
structures have hindered the ability to identify needs and requirements, develop a branch 
identity, and advertise the capabilities of CA forces efficiently. 
The next chapter discusses the role that CA can play as an influencing force by 
outlining different types of influence and how CA can move beyond a post-conflict force 
to one that shapes environments, influences populations, and prevents conflicts through 
civil military engagement.  
 24 
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III. INFLUENCE AND CIVIL AFFAIRS 
A. INTRODUCTION 
As Chapter II described, CA has been employed largely in an ad hoc fashion, and 
mostly, as a post-conflict stabilization force. However, FM 3-57, the Civil Affairs Field 
Manual, defines CA core tasks as those that “promote U.S. policy objectives before, 
during, and after combat operations by influencing the civil component of the operational 
area.”85 This definition suggests that CA require a much wider range of skills and 
mission sets, particularly in the realm of pre-conflict influence. To understand this 
underutilized aspect of CA better, this chapter discusses the direct and indirect influence 
of CA operations within Cialdini’s and Watkins’ frameworks for creating influence. 
Specifically, it examines types of CA influence, how CA operates within the circle of 
influence, and the importance of professionalism, specialties, and credibility needed for 
CA soldiers to effectively influence in the tactical, operational, and strategic realms.  
This chapter asserts that CA is an underutilized force for creating influence, and 
should play a critical role in multi-dimensional, hybrid operating environments, in which 
building influence is paramount. These types of operations will most likely be the kinds 
of engagements that U.S. SOF will conduct after forces draw down from Afghanistan in 
2014.86 Therefore, CA, the wider SOF community, the Army, and non-DOD entities 
should better understand and utilize CA as an influence building force.  
B. THEORIES OF INFLUENCE 
1. Cialdini 
For the purpose of this chapter, influence is distilled down to the capacity or 
power to affect the behaviors and perceptions of individuals or groups of people, while 
persuasion is an act to change behaviors. Ultimately, the leading question then becomes 
how to develop the capability and power to truly influence. The answer can greatly help 
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understand and enhance military and full spectrum operations in the proposed seventh 
function of warfighting, the human domain. The seventh warfighting function focuses 
specifically on “the related tasks and systems that influence the behaviors of a people, 
security forces, and governments.”87 
In Influence: The Psychology of Persuasion, Robert B. Cialdini, a professor of 
psychology, divides influence into six principles: reciprocation, commitment and 
consistency, social proof, liking, authority, and scarcity. He suggests these are “governed 
by a psychological principle that directs human behavior,” which makes people 
susceptible to influence.88 While no one principle is more powerful than the other, with a 
combination of these weapons, he asserts that people are more likely to be influenced. 
One weapon of influence, reciprocation, suggests that, “we should try to repay, in-
kind, what another person has provided us.”89 A simple example is, if someone buys 
another person a cup of coffee, the person who receives the free cup of coffee would 
likely return the favor and buy the first person a cup coffee. This weapon creates an 
obligation to repay an act, even if the request was not made. Alvin Gouldner, a renowned 
sociologist suggests, “There is no human society that does not subscribe to the rule [of 
reciprocation].”90 Cialdini even states, “A favor is to be met with another favor; it is not 
to be met with neglect, and certainly not with attack.”91 These factors make reciprocation 
an effective influencing technique if executed properly as is discussed later in this 
chapter.  
Another important weapon is commitment and consistency. Many psychologists 
agree that, “the desire for consistency is a central motivator of our behavior.”92 Humans 
by nature are creatures of habit, which makes consistency an important social influencing 
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tool. Cialdini suggests that consistency can even cause people to act in ways clearly 
contrary to their own best interest.93 While it may not be the desired intent when 
influencing, it is important to know that this capability exists. For example, consistency 
can be applied to individuals simply by getting them to agree to a request. They may even 
assume personal risk to honor the commitment rather than appear inconsistent.  
Social proof is a third tool of influence. Walter Lippmann describes social proof 
simply as, “Where all think alike, no one thinks very much.”94 People act and think like 
the others around them. Social proof is, in other words, a form of peer pressure. This type 
of influence is prevalent in cults and often in radical groups with very strong beliefs in a 
cause. Furthermore, Cialdini notes that the strongest forms of social proof occur when 
peoples’ confidence is shaken.95 This perception is important as these types of 
environments, particularly undergoverned areas, or those with a low intensity conflict, are 
the places in which SOF units will likely operate; SOF should, therefore, have an 
influencing capability that can leverage social proof to its advantage.  
Liking is another way to achieve influence. “Few people would be surprised to 
learn that, as a rule, we prefer to say yes to the requests of someone we know and like.”96 
Cialdini suggests traits such as physical attractiveness, similarity, as well as behaviors 
like complements and cooperation, affect whether or not someone is liked.97 Many hours 
of training are spent developing rapport building as a means of leveraging liking in CA 
operations utilizing Cialdini’s traits. For example, soldiers conduct exercises in liking 
with robust scenarios with diverse and dynamic professional role players specifically 
focused on building communication and rapport building.  
Authority is yet another tool of influence. Cialdini states, “people are trained from 
birth to obey proper authority, and submission to such authority is right while 
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disobedience is wrong and usually followed with some type of punishment.”98 This 
socializing can trigger natural responses to obey without questioning if the authority is 
accepted as right.99 The advertising industry uses this type of authority to market 
products with professional athletes, scientists, and doctors. Cialdini suggests that titles 
“are simultaneously the most difficult and easiest symbols of authority to acquire; one 
can either take years of work and achievement to acquire while the other is merely 
adopting a label.”100 He also provides evidence that even clothes can trigger mechanical 
compliance, such as uniforms or business suits.101 These factors help create the persona 
of authority that allows the influencer to be more effective.  
Finally, there is scarcity. “People seem to be more motivated by the thought of 
losing something than the thought of gaining something of equal value.”102 This type of 
influence is exerted at auctions, during the first minutes of a store opening on Black 
Friday, or when only one model of the hottest car is left on the lot. When items are 
perceived to be important but scarce, their value increases.103 Scarcity is a potentially 
useful tool for CA, especially with limited resources and time; CA soldiers can be 
selective and conduct targeted assistance leveraging naturally scarce resources and 
services. Cialdini’s six principles are summarized in Figure 4.  
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Figure 4.  Cialdini’s Weapons of Influence104 
2. Watkins 
Michael Watkins, an associate professor of management at the Harvard Business 
School, presents another useful theory of influence. In his article, “In Practice: Principles 
of Persuasion,” he argues that, to influence a target audience effectively, the actor must 
first map the “influence landscape.”105 It is necessary to identify which groups are 
supportive and which groups are not. He also suggests that ultimately coalitions must be 
built to secure support for their initiatives, and prevent or neutralize any blocking 
coalitions.106 This process involves identifying the key players within the population, 
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their interests, and motivations.107 This process is similar to that of “mapping the human 
terrain,” which is collecting and mapping information about the population in an area of 
operation. Overall, it is more beneficial to know who and what people are dealing with, 
and if they have a certain agenda or group they desire to influence. The practice of 
influence landscaping helps to identify the individuals or groups necessary or most 
beneficial to influence. 
Watkins outlines additional steps necessary for persuading and influencing people 
and groups, such as shaping perceptions of interest, and perceptions of alternatives.108 He 
believes it is important to shape these perceptions to gain the desired outcome. Being able 
to shape perceptions sets the groundwork for successful negotiations, which will 
inevitably occur. Watkins further contends that the actor must gain the audience’s support 
for tough decisions,109 which often involves gaining acceptance from those opposed to 
the actor’s decisions and motivate them to be able to accept these choices. He suggests 
that creating a fair process, engaging in shared diagnosis, consulting before deciding, and 
giving what is asked for will lead to better acceptance amongst those affected.110 
Although it is not always possible to give everything asked for, people are more likely to 
accept the outcomes knowing that the process was fair in coming to the ultimate decision. 
Watkins further argues it is crucial to persuade from a distance because it is 
impossible to communicate one-to-one with everyone who needs to be influenced.111 His 
examples include constructing reliable communication channels and matching the 
medium to the message.112 Reliable communication channels are critical to disseminating 
the message, but just as important, is how the message is conveyed. In addition, Watkins 
suggests that focus and repetition be incorporated into communications.113 In other 
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words, the message to be understood is sent out repeatedly until it is determined that the 
message has successfully been received and understood. Finally, one of the most 
important points Watkins makes, which is similar to Cialdini’s liking and authority, is 
that it is critical to build personal credibility to influence and persuade. “Leaders with a 
reputation for integrity are better able to shape people’s perceptions of their interest in 
alternatives because they are respected, considered trustworthy, and perceived to possess 
the experience to make good judgments.”114 Building personal credibility takes time, 
effort, and the integrity and willpower to do so; it is an investment in human capital. 
Combining Cialdini’s weapons of influence and Watkins’ principles of persuasion 
with the CA core tasks reveals an effective influencing mechanism. CA’s missions, by 
nature, require CA soldiers to engage in influencing. Reciprocation, liking, commitment, 
and consistency are standard operating procedures for CA soldiers when engaging with 
the local population. Without these weapons of influence, CA missions become difficult, 
they lose focus, and policy objectives often become unattainable. Additionally, the 
principles of persuasion allow CA soldiers a better understanding of the human domain, 
an area in which they are tasked to be experts.  
C. CIVIL AFFAIRS AS AN INFLUENCE FORCE 
Building off this discussion on what influence is and how to influence a target 
audience, CA has several tactics and skill sets that make it an ideal influencing force. 
First, CA is a unique force, in which regular interaction with the populace is a 
requirement for mission success. In fact, FM 3-57 states that CA forces must personally 
communicate and liaison with civilians, civil authorities, civilian institutions and 
governments.115 Second, CA soldiers are educated and trained in engagement strategies 
that aim to maximize influence, identifying civil vulnerabilities, and synchronizing 
efforts with other U.S. and host nation entities.116 Third, CA soldiers are also trained in 
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program and project management to leverage aid as a means of influence.117 Finally, CA 
soldiers are educated in governance to shape continuing development and stability within 
their target area. These skill sets are beneficial to an influence campaign. Kim Cragin and 
Scott Gerwehr, authors of Dissuading Terror: Strategic Influence in the Struggle Against 
Terrorism, define an influence campaign as “planned operations—covert and/or overt—
to convey selected information and indicators to foreign audiences. Such campaigns 
attempt to influence the perceptions, cognitions, and behavior of foreign governments, 
organizations, groups, and individuals.”118 
While the article focuses primarily on psychological operations, many of the same 
principles apply to CA operations reinforcing CA’s role in influence. 
The CA five-core tasks, as discussed in Chapter II, are populace and resource 
control (PRC), foreign humanitarian assistance (FHA), civil information management 
(CIM), nation assistance (NA), and support to civil administration (SCA). These tasks are 
all means of influence. Focusing on these aspects brings expertise necessary to influence 
authority. Additionally, the core tasks “provide expertise in civil-sector functions, 
normally the responsibility of the civilian authorities, applied to implement U.S. policy 
and advise or assist in rehabilitating or restoring civil-sector functions.”119 These 
capabilities establish credibility amongst the local populace, military, and government 
agencies, and, coupled with Cialdini’s and Watkins’ frameworks, can become a 
significant influencing capability across all three operational levels. Figure 5 depicts a 
common environment in which different entities commonly exert their specific expertise. 
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Figure 5.  Map of Expertise Needed for Successful Stability Operations120 
D. INTERACTION AND FAMILIARITY WITH THE POPULACE 
CA forces conduct regular face-to-face encounters, scheduled meetings, telephone 
conversations, or other audio/visual mediums that all contain some type of influencing 
activity.121 One of the most basic tasks for CA is key leader engagements or KLEs. CA 
soldiers engage with local civilians in a venue, which is most natural to civilians, such as 
their town hall or other meeting places. Meetings occur on a regular basis and subjects 
discussed are related to tools of influence, such as development projects, aid, or 
assistance. These conform to Cialdini’s principles of liking, commitment and 
consistency, and eventually, reciprocation.  
                                                 
120 Michael J. Meese and Sean M. Morgan, “New Requirements for Army Expert Knowledge: 
Afghanistan and Iraq,” in The Future of the Army Profession, ed. Don Snider and Lloyd Matthews (Boston, 
MA: McGraw Hill, 2005), 359. 
121 U.S. Army, U.S. Army Field Manual 3-13, Inform and Influence Activities (Washington, DC: 
Headquarters, U.S. Army, January 25, 2013), 8–1. 
 34 
This direct access to the population often provides significant information and 
understanding of what is motivating the people, which often can enhance further 
influence. CA soldiers are trained to view the environment through the lens of the civilian 
populace naturally creating similarity, which is essential for the principle “liking.” 
Cialdini suggests relationships based off liking are often the strongest.122 Additionally, 
CA soldiers are trained to inject themselves into the local populace and assimilate by 
understanding and becoming comfortable with the language, customs, and culture.123 
Building this similarity increases trust and cooperation with the local populace. This 
training is specific to CA and necessary to influence successfully as an alternative means 
to direct force. 
E. CIVIL AFFAIRS ENGAGEMENT STRATEGY 
CA missions have the potential for direct or indirect influence. Informal meetings 
and merely conversing with village leaders begins to build the trust essential for influence 
operations. However, all CA missions should be tied to a desired effect that contributes to 
the overall goals of the operational and strategic missions.124 While military information 
support operations (MISO) influence through messages, CA influences through 
actions.125 CA actions range from basic civil engagements to complex civil development 
programs. CA’s specific niche, its access to the populace, allows for significant 
influencing. These engagements are critical for building trust, which allows for further 
influence of the target group.  
It is important to note that engagement, by nature, influences regardless if planned 
or not. CA soldiers plan their engagement strategy by utilizing the circle of influence, 
which may include, but are not limited to, families, tribes, friends, religious leaders, and 
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government officials.126 For example, a CA meeting could be with the local Minister of 
Health. The minister holds a government position; however, he may be the head of a tribe 
and/or a religious leader with an extended family. A simple meeting with a person of 
such stature can penetrate many levels of the circle of influence. CA soldiers are educated 
and trained to find such people to maximize influence. While much of the influence 
occurs through direct contact and personal engagements, influence can also be indirect. 
Not interacting with a select populace can be just as effective at influencing.  
F. PROGRAMS AND PROJECTS AS A MEANS FOR INFLUENCE 
CA forces use different funding streams to maximize influence through projects 
and programs. After identifying the need or critical civil vulnerabilities, CA soldiers 
develop programs to reduce, mitigate, or eliminate civil vulnerabilities through the 
construction of physical infrastructure, assistance with planning or training, and subject 
matter expert exchanges. The focus of these programs is to develop the capacity and 
capability of indigenous groups, foreign militaries, or local governments to adopt or 
champion these efforts in the future. Ideally, these engagements will also affect the 
population in a positive manner and deny the opportunity for violent extremist groups to 
root themselves in the population. The U.S. Institute for Peace recommends a similar 
approach to stability through core service delivery. 
                                                 




Figure 6.  U.S. Institute for Peace, Core Service Delivery127 
In the midst of the conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan, the Army identified the 
utility of development programs and projects as a means to influence populations. The 
military went to great lengths to develop this capability and created a manual to address 
this issue, the U.S. Army’s Money as a Weapons System Handbook. The handbook states, 
“Warfighters with timely access to the right types of money and in the appropriate 
amount can influence the outcome of operations with both temporary and, hopefully, 
permanent results.”128 The employment of money occurs when “warfighters at brigade, 
battalion, and company level in a counterinsurgency (COIN) environment employ money 
as a weapons system to win the hearts and minds of the indigenous population to 
facilitate defeating the insurgents. Money is one of the primary weapons used by 
warfighters to achieve successful mission results in COIN and humanitarian operations.” 
General David Petraeus, when in command of the 101st Airborne Division in 2004, even 
                                                 
127 United States Institute of Peace, Guiding Principles for Stabilization and Reconstruction 
(Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace, 2009), 8–101. 
128 Center for Army Lessons Learned, Handbook 09-27 Commander’s Guide to Money As a Weapons 
System (Leavenworth, KS: Center for Army Lessons Learned), April 2009, 1. 
 37 
went so far as to say, “Money is my most important ammunition in this war.”129 In most 
cases, units and individuals identified to employ money as a weapons system did so to 
achieve immediate and tactical-level effects for their AOR. Although not the only force 
to have access to development funds, CA operators are defined by their core tasks, 
training, and experience to achieve broader goals and objectives through the employment 
of programs and projects.  
An example of CA as a force that provides unique access to the population for the 
purpose of influence comes from the desert in Trans-Sahara Africa. A CA sponsored 
solar-powered well was constructed to influence a small nomadic populace and act as a 
meeting place to conduct targeted influence operations. Like the Apaches, the 
convenience of the well attracted the nomadic people to visit and congregate near the 
fresh water source. The project was also effective in influencing the local populace with 
water, which they desperately needed, and was nested within a larger government 
sponsored irrigation program. Ashraf Ghani and Clare Lockhart, the authors of Fixing 
Failed States: A Framework for Rebuilding a Fractured World agree, “the military brings 
a much needed alternative perspective to development and easily grasp the need for state-
building doctrine.”130 When done correctly, such projects can have a significant impact 
in shaping the environment and influencing a target audience; just one example of 
influencing through action in which the how and why were carefully planned and tied to 
the overall mission.  
Too often, these projects are undertaken randomly, however, without a greater 
purpose of influence for a wider effect. Many CA units fall victim to the “aid complex” 
trap and will conduct what is commonly referred to as “random acts of kindness.” In 
other words, units execute an expedient and mediocre assessment of an area and 
randomly decide to do a project tied to effects unrelated to the success of the overall 
mission. Additionally, with programs such as “Money As a Weapons System,” Ghani and 
Lockhart point out, “It is assumed that money is the key to success for influence. Many 
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involved with counterinsurgency to development would agree. Recently, though, the core 
activity of aid systems is the stewardship of very large funds.”131 Along with these large 
funds, focus is lost, and often, the expenditure of funds as a quantitative measurement for 
performance and success replaces influence. 
This type of behavior amongst CA forces has come to be known as “CA’s body 
count.” Measures of effectiveness (MOEs) become confused and replaced with measures 
of performance (MOPs). This trend is similar to one that Hy Rothstein identifies in his 
article “Less is More: The Problematic Future of Irregular Warfare in an Era of 
Collapsing States.” He suggests that the United States has a habit of conducting wars in 
which irregular threats are handled quantitatively, based on a subjective scale of 
importance or threat posed to U.S. interests, even when a quantitative approach 
undermines strategic outcomes.132 This quantitative approach was obvious in Iraq and 
Afghanistan, in which the numbers of projects were more important than the projects 
themselves or the outcome achieved. Karen Guttieri, who studied the metrics used by the 
U.S. military in Iraq, points out, “the complexity of stability operations exhausts the 
capacity of analytical tools developed for conventional war, including the combat centric 
metrics dominating the literature on military effectiveness.”133 Therefore, with the lack of 
solid metrics, the common practice in Iraq and Afghanistan was to have greater 
expenditure of funds and higher rates than other efforts in different parts of the country. 
Operational and strategic outcomes were lesser considerations; the focus was clearly on 
spending through tactical operations. Ghani and Lockhart point out that, “Many quick-
impact projects neither meet the criteria of economic feasibility and financial viability nor 
address the fundamental issue of sustainable paths out of poverty.”134 
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Furthermore, Ghani and Lockhart coin the term “the aid complex,” which 
describes the business and industry that has grown from the aid community.135 CA is part 
of this community; however, the kind of influence CA wants is not found through 
random projects. “Good intentions are wasted without positive effects.”136 As Ghani and 
Lockhart state, “Without an approach based on a clear analysis of the state’s core 
functions, it continues to deal with the symptoms rather than the cause of the 
problem.”137 CA training and experience emphasize these concepts; however, additional 
education could further the professionalization of the force and increase its ability to 
influence a populace to maximize effectiveness. 
An area ripe for CA education, and which is currently underemphasized, is 
governance. The current training exhibits a lack of governance training especially within 
the active CA component. This training could focus specifically on issues within 
governance, such as rule of law. Ghani and Lockhart discuss the influence rule of law has 
on a society.  
When rule of law takes hold, it creates a reinforcing loop of stability, 
predictability, trust and empowerment. First, rule of law stabilizes 
government and holds it accountable. Second, it sets a predictable 
environment to allow long term planning. Third, it creates confidence in 
the public. And fourth, it empowers those in civil society and the economy 
to take initiatives, form associations, create companies, and work within 
the confines of the state more broadly.138  
CA strives for this is the type of influence. It is difficult to realize solely at the 
tactical level; however, if implemented and coordinated at the operational and strategic 
levels, and with an educated force, such effects are achievable. Including educated and 
experienced senior CA soldiers in strategic and operational planning to include shaping 
operations in phase zero, as well as support to stability operations, and the reconstruction 
and development phases of engagement will allow the Army to receive maximum utility 
from the investment in CA soldiers. 
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Finally, Echevarria contends that when looking at how the United States has 
fought wars historically, “The concept of war rarely extended beyond winning battles and 
campaigns –therefore, the American way of war was more of a way of battle rather than a 
way of war.”139 A new indirect approach of influence, speed, maneuver, flexibility, and 
surprise will be more effective than “the traditional dependence on overwhelming force, 
mass and concentration.”140 As senior commanders and policy makers review these 
concepts, the importance of such operations reveals the need for forces, such as CA, and 
the influence they exert.  
The next chapter outlines what is currently taught to CA officers in the 
qualification course. It shows that, despite the tremendous potential as an influencing 
force, the current education lacks critical areas of education and training, such as 
understanding what influence is and how and why it is necessary. A lack of training and 
understanding exists of the strategic influence necessary to permeate throughout all three 
levels of operations. The next chapter also lays out a proposed operational level course 
that currently does not exist, which focuses on leveraging influence.  
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IV. CIVIL AFFAIRS TRAINING 
This chapter discusses current CA requirements and training for active duty CA 
run through the John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School at Fort Bragg, NC. 
The chapter begins by discussing DOD requirements for CA. Building off Chapter III on 
influence, the chapter then discusses the shortfalls of the current training in preparing CA 
soldiers for influence operations. The chapter also discusses the missed opportunity for 
advanced training and education for CA soldiers. 
This chapter demonstrates that U.S. Army Special Operations Command does not 
optimally prepare active duty CA for employment as an influencing force, but rather 
continues to prepare them more for stability operations. As the U.S. government pulls its 
forces out of Afghanistan and moves towards smaller engagements, CA training needs to 
change to prepare CA soldiers better for influence and shaping operations, as well as 
large-scale stability operations.  
A. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE SPECIFIED TASKS FOR CIVIL AFFAIRS 
The DOD, through directives to the uniformed services, specify the requirements 
for the armed services to maintain the capability for providing, building, and supporting 
governance in conjunction with, or in the absence of, civil authorities. In 2005, and again 
in 2009, DODD 3000.05 identified stability operations as a core military mission, one 
that the military will be prepared to conduct with parity of combat operations.141 In 
addition, this directive ordered the services to maintain a capability for the following. 
Lead stability operations activities to establish civil security and civil 
control, restore essential services, repair and protect critical infrastructure, 
and deliver humanitarian assistance until such time as it is feasible to 
transition lead responsibility to other U.S. Government agencies, foreign 
governments and security forces, or international governmental 
organizations.142 
                                                 




All branches of the military play a role in stability operations; however, the Army, 
due to its size and mission scope, has a particularly large role in stability operations.  
In addition to the CA core tasks discussed in Chapter II, the 2014 DOD Directive 
2000.13, Civil Affairs, identifies the requirement to maintain a CA force capable of 
providing support to stability operations. Two requirements are identified.  
Provide expertise in civilian sector functions that normally are the 
responsibility of civilian authorities. That expertise is applied to 
implement DOD policies to advise or assist in rehabilitating or restoring 
civilian sector functions…Establish and conduct military government until 
civilian authority or government can be restored.143 
The Army has the largest professional CA force and, therefore, will bear the largest share 
of the military burden in a full-scale or protracted stability operation mission. The bulk of 
the skills for civilian sector expertise reside within the Army reserve CA functional 
specialties.144 Finally, the 2008 DOD Directive 3000.07 identifies the follow 
requirements for irregular warfare. 
Through direct or indirect means, and on a large scale when required, 
support a foreign government or population threatened by irregular 
adversaries…Create a safe, secure environment in fragile states and, if 
required, provide essential governmental services, emergency 
infrastructure restoration, and humanitarian relief.145 
These various directives demonstrate that requirements for CA support, specifically, CA 
support to governance crosses multiple military missions and skill sets. The number of 
tasks that Army CA is expected to cover creates considerable challenges for training and 
education. The remainder of the chapter examines CA training, identifies areas for 
improvement, and proposes a way forward for a professional CA force. 
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B. CIVIL AFFAIRS TRAINING 
To prepare civil affairs soldiers properly, a balance of training and education is 
necessary. Military training is the instruction of personnel to enhance their capacity to 
perform specific military functions and tasks, while military education is the systematic 
instruction of individuals and subjects that will enhance their knowledge in the art and 
science of war.146 The complex environments in which CA soldiers operate require 
education and training beyond the scope of the professional military education system.  
Currently, training and education for a CA officer is limited to the tactical level. 
The civil affairs qualification course (CAQC) is the only formal and required CA training 
or education officers will receive in their career; no CA advanced courses exist beyond 
the initial training. CA training during the CAQC is limited to only 13 weeks; the 
remaining 29 weeks of 42 total weeks is devoted to language training and regional 
studies. The majority of the time in training is spent on language, the skill that is most 
perishable, seldom used, and difficult to maintain. See Figure 7, Active Duty Civil 
Affairs Pipeline. 
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Figure 7.  CA Training Pipeline147  
The 13 weeks of CA training can be further broken down by phase. Phase One is 
a one-week introduction to CA. This portion of the training defines CA and CA 
operations, in addition to administratively preparing the students for the remainder of the 
course. The bulk of CA training occurs in the eight weeks of Phase Three. This training 
consists of five modules: Module A, Civil Affairs Core Tasks; Module B, Civil Affairs 
Engagements; Module C, Civil Affairs Information Management; Module D, Civil 
Affairs Methodology; and Survivability. The remaining four weeks are experiential 
learning and application during Operation SLUSS-TILLER, the culmination exercise for 
the CAQC. Upon completion of the CAQC, captains are able to operate at the tactical 
level with a common knowledge foundation. See Figure 8.  
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Figure 8.  CA Training Pipeline by Module148 
C. SHORT FALLS OF CURRENT CIVIL AFFAIRS TRAINING 
The Civil Affairs Qualification Course is limited to the tactical level by several 
factors. First, the course is designed for captains and their role as a CA team leader; in 
that sense, the course may seem to be tailored appropriately for the audience. 
Alternatively, CA captains are expected to tie their operations and effects to operational 
and strategic level objectives, for which, however, they are not specifically educated. A 
study of the National Defense Strategy and blocks of instruction on operational planning 
and systems analysis are taught in the beginning of phase three. However, aside from this 
one block of courses, no real link exists to operational planning and operational orders 
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production, which makes it difficult for many CA soldiers to plan, operate, and influence 
effectively at the operational and strategic levels.  
Second, senior CA captains, without much training or experience at the 
operational level, instruct the CAQC. Their only CA experience has likely been as team 
leader or battalion staff officer. By this measure, the model of using captains as 
instructors in the course limits the subject matter to the tactical level with little ties to 
overarching military goals or U.S. objectives. 
CA works in complex and unstable environments, which makes training 
challenging and requires a range of skills spanning weapons proficiency to knowledge in 
governance. To best prepare for complicated environments, and to conduct CA 
operations more effectively, additional education outside of the professional military 
education system is required.149 Department of the Army pamphlet (DA PAM) 600-3 
describes skills unique to the CA officer. 
They must have the ability to solve complex political-military problems 
and to develop and employ conventional and unconventional solutions. 
They also must be able to devise and execute nonstandard and non-
doctrinal methods and techniques, when applicable, to remedy unforeseen 
circumstances. They also must be capable of decisive action in missions 
for which no doctrine exists.150 
Reserve CA includes six functional specialties: rule of law, economic stability, 
infrastructure, public health and welfare, and public education and information. A 
fundamental knowledge of these areas, not currently found in the CAQC, may better 
prepare active CA operators to identify, reduce, mitigate, or eliminate critical civil 
vulnerabilities in the contemporary and future operating environments. See Figure 9. 
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Figure 9.  Educational Proposal #1 
Furthermore, CA soldiers often face “wicked problems.” According to Rittel and 
Webber, wicked problems have 10 characteristics: 1) no definitive formulation exists, 2) 
wicked problems have no stopping rule, 3) solutions to wicked problems are not true or 
false, but good or bad, 4) no immediate or final test of a solution to a wicked problem is 
available, 5) every solution to a wicked problem is a “one-shot operation” because no 
opportunity exists to learn by trial and error, every attempt counts significantly, 6) 
wicked problems do not have an enumerable set of potential solutions nor does a well 
described set of permissible operations exists that can be incorporated into the plan, 7) 
every wicked problem is essentially unique, 8) every wicked problem can be considered 
to be a symptom of another problem, 9) an observer’s world view is the strongest factor 
explaining which solutions to favor and promote, and 10) the problem solver has no right 
to be wrong.151  
                                                 
151 Horst W. J. Rittel and Melvin M. Webber, “Dilemmas in General Theory of Planning,” Policy 
Sciences 4 (1973): 161–166. 
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This definition is powerful in the fact that little to no training is available to solve 
wicked problems. Education and experience are necessary for CA soldiers just to begin 
working on wicked problems. For example, in developing nations, an identifiable 
symptom in an unstable state may be a smaller piece to a maladjusted or disequilibrated 
system. As Nancy Roberts describes in “A Design Approach to Wicked Problems,” 
addressing a symptom may further intensify the problem or it may lead to taming the 
problem. Taming the problem refers to addressing only parts of the problem that are 
understandable while not addressing the problem as a whole.152 The limited education 
received during the CAQC leads CA soldiers most likely to tame problems rather than 
address the whole of the system.  
D. THE NEED FOR A CIVIL AFFAIRS OPERATIONAL AND STRATEGIC 
LEVEL EDUCATION 
The soon-to-be implemented special warfare advanced analysis and targeting 
course (SWAATC) will help bridge the gap between tactical and operational arenas. The 
SWAATC is designed to enhance the operator’s ability to research, analyze, target, and 
plan activities to build, degrade, mitigate, or exploit critical factors of state, counter state, 
and neutral actors. The course will also enhance the operator’s ability to utilize and 
employ analytical and targeting frameworks to the human domain across the full 
spectrum of special warfare.  
Upon completion of this course, a CA senior captain or major would be able to 
plan effectively at the embassy or JSOTF level. Furthermore, officers would be able to 
understand and more effectively influence the populace while tying strategic and 
operational goals and objectives to these influencing operations. This course is not the 
total solution to the lack of training currently being offered CA soldiers, but one of 
several steps towards investing in human capital and educating the force. See the 
SWAATC course curriculum in the Appendix. 
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 49 
Finally, as described, a common and coordinating theme among the CA 
functional specialties and the mission of Army CA is training and education in 
governance. Specializing in governance at all levels local—district and state—would 
prepare CA professionals for common areas of concern in developing countries or states 
affected by conflict or instability. Additionally, focusing on governance would fulfill 
requirements outlined in DODDs for CA,153 stability operations,154 and irregular 
warfare.155 
E. CREDENTIALING AND HIGHER EDUCATION IN CIVIL AFFAIRS 
The education and credentialing of Army CA are paramount to the ability to 
conduct credible CA operations in complex and unstable environments. Graduate-level 
education would provide a common credential for CA in the international community. 
This requirement corresponds to Cialdini’s principles of influence, discussed in Chapter 
II, specifically the ideas of authority and titling. Whether the Army finds itself in a 
peacetime phase zero environment conducting shaping operations, engaged in hybrid 
wars156 or stability operations, CA operations will be necessary. Most likely, any 
deployment of CA personnel would be working in conjunction with members of the U.S. 
interagency, the international community and NGOs, all of which place great value in 
and require graduate education in their own organizations.157 Credentialing would better 
prepare CA for engaging the complex environments of modern warfare and provide 
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legitimacy to CA officers to better collaborate with the multitude of actors present in 
these conflicts.  
Examples of similar professions exist within other agencies. The UN, for 
example, has a CA career field that conducts a range of tasks, which parallel Army CA in 
tactics and techniques, for the purposes of peace building and peacekeeping. The UN 
Civil Affairs Handbook describes the following as fundamental to the core success of 
civil affairs.  
Building relationships with local actors at the community level; listening 
to, liaising with and supporting local efforts at stabilization, conflict 
resolution and peace building; and supporting and building local capacity 
at the community level in order to strengthen the reach and authority of 
the state.158 
A career in UN CA requires an, “advanced university degree (master’s degree or 
equivalent) in social sciences, political science, international relations, public 
administration, anthropology, law, economics, or related area.”159 These requirements for 
the UN CA career field offer useful suggestions for building similar requirements for 
U.S. Army CA.  
Currently, to qualify for the U.S. Army CA branch, an officer in a certain year of 
service must possess a baccalaureate degree, be eligible for a top-secret clearance, 
possess the aptitude to learn a foreign language, and be willing to volunteer for airborne 
training.160 Upon passing the Civil Affairs Assessment and Selection (CAAS), the officer 
will complete the Civil Affairs Qualification Course with a new career field designation 
and a handshake, but with no specific credentials. To maximize the U.S. Army CA’ 
participation in the planning for and execution of unified land operations, shaping 
operations, or humanitarian assistance and disaster relief, a graduate degree for CA 
officers is necessary to advance the profession. 
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Moreover, if CA are to bridge the link between the military and civilian agencies 
and organizations, the education of CA soldiers should be equivalent and complementary 
to their civilian contemporaries. A master’s degree from the National Defense University, 
for example, will expose soldiers to similar concepts but it lacks the recognition and 
credibility that a degree from the Harvard Kennedy School or University of North 
Carolina at Chapel Hill’s School of Government will evoke from the civilian sector. 
The initial introduction to education is vital to the ability of the branch to prepare 
future CA officers who will not have the benefit of coming of age in the Global War on 
Terror; but the effort cannot end at that point. To be a specialist or an expert, the role of 
education for CA officers must continue throughout their career. As Samuel Huntington 
describes, “expertise is acquired through prolonged education and experience.”161 To 
engage in the tactical and operational levels, CA officers equipped with a graduate 
education, experiential training, and developing experience will suffice. To expand the 
breadth of CA to addressing regional or theater level conditions of instability, additional 
education and experience is required.  
A recent Military Affairs article argues that the traditional career model and 
professional military education system lacks the ability to train military officers for 
operational and strategic level operations and planning.162 This observation is particularly 
true of CA. Operational and strategic CA operators and planners require a broad 
knowledge of economics, governments in the region, and a historical context of the 
theater of operation. These requirements demand a master’s degree, and in some cases, a 
doctoral level education. The School of Advanced Military Studies justifies the need for a 
PhD program by stating, “A military strategic planner must be able to inform strategic 
debate through coherent analysis and dialogue with influential thinkers within and 
outside government.”163 The same argument holds true for CA.  
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In hazardous environments, unlike Foreign Service officers or aid workers, CA 
soldiers have the ability to provide their own security. The tactical and survivability 
training of CA forces allows them the ability to work in semi- and non-permissive 
environments in which civilian aid and development workers cannot. In these instances, 
CA forces, trained in governance, would be best positioned to build, support, or augment 
governments until that task can be transitioned to a civilian agency or the local 
government is again capable of normal operation.164 
Given these many requirements, the goal for a regionally specialized, CA senior 
leader and advisor at the geographic combatant commands (GCCs) should be a CA 
colonel with a relevant PhD, coupled with experience studying and working in his 
assigned theater of responsibility. A regionally specialized and educated colonel is best 
equipped to advise, synchronize, and direct theater-wide CA activities in support of the 
GCC commander and U.S. government objectives. 
1. Education Proposal #1 
A number of education options are available to meet these CA-specific 
requirements. The addition of a variety of social science classes, with a focus on 
governance at the graduate education level in the CAQC, could provide a bridge toward 
higher education and allow junior CA officers a baseline of knowledge from which to 
draw upon in their missions abroad. Such a program could produce CA officers, 
governance specialists, and broad-spectrum social scientists prepared to identify, reduce, 
eliminate, or mitigate critical civil vulnerabilities in foreign populations in support of 
military goals and U.S. government objectives.  
Experienced CA officers, who have completed a graduate-level program through 
the comprehensive exams required to become a doctoral candidate, would be an ideal co-
instructor at the CAQC, and more importantly, future advanced CA courses, while 
completing their dissertation. The candidate would be responsible for the inclusion of 
social science principles, theories, and case studies alongside senior CA captains who 
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have recently returned from the operational force to instruct students in the most current 
tactics, techniques, and procedures; this configuration would better prepare CA soldiers 
in training for the complex realities of CA operations.  
Partnership with a major university should be sought so that the military 
instructors, and PhD candidates, act as an adjunct professor to a nearby institution. Such 
an arrangement may allow the ability to confer a master’s degree from the partnered 
institution upon the completion of the CA qualification course. This partnership would 
lend credibility to the branch through the standard credential of a master’s degree for new 
CA captains while allowing more senior CA officers the opportunity to complete their 
doctoral dissertation before returning to the operational force. Additionally, conferring a 
degree from an established university eliminates the need to seek academic accreditation 
of the U.S. Army John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School. 
The phases of the CA course, proposed in this project, lend themselves to brief 
but intensive graduate education blocks. For example, the four-week regional studies 
phase may easily translate into graduate courses in regional specific politics, economics, 
history, culture, and religion. Following the eight-week CA phase would be an ideal time 
to add a four-week course in the fundamental principles of rule of law, economics, public 
policy, and authorities, as well as an introduction to design thinking and wicked problems 
in support of the CA core tasks and influence operations. An additional four-week phase 
in the study of government would provide each CA officer a common knowledge in 
governance. Keeping the graduate instruction compartmentalized in four-week blocks 
allows reserve CA officers the opportunity to return to the Special Warfare Center and 
School on 29-day orders for graduate certificates in regional studies, government, or 
social science.  
This course of action would extend the CAQC by eight weeks but would more 
aptly prepare burgeoning CA practitioners for the complex and unstable environment 
they will face in addition to providing a civilian master’s degree credential. 
 54 
2. Education Proposal #2 
As an alternative to graduate education in the CAQC, the University of North 
Carolina Chapel Hill and Clemson University, among others, offer online programs in a 
Master’s of Public Administration. Additionally, schools, such as Johns Hopkins 
University, offer a Master of Arts in Government that is entirely online. Such programs 
could be offered over a multi-year period beginning with the CAQC, to be completed at 
the convenience of the service member, and would enhance the capacity and capability of 
CA teams in their missions. Capitalizing on online education options will require a 
significant time investment from the service member, as well as the unit, although the 
academic foundation for CA forces and credentialing can still be obtained while soldiers 
are at their units.  
This course of action, while successful in exposing CA operators to graduate 
education, may occur too late in the officer’s career. In many cases, CA officers have one 
opportunity as a CA team leader, and the team leader position often directly follows 
completion of the CA qualification course. In this instance, an online master’s degree 
option may come too late in the officer’s professional timeline to benefit the team, the 
unit, and the area to which the CA team may have deployed. 
3. Education Proposal #3 
Modifying the Naval Postgraduate School’s Stability, Security and Development 
in Complex Operations (SSDCO) curriculum could provide another option for the 
educational foundation of CA. The SSDCO course consists of three to four weeks of 
distributed learning followed by four weeks of in-residence coursework.165 In its current 
state, the SSDCO is a graduate certificate-producing program with a follow on 
educational opportunity focusing on rule of law. The opportunity exists to develop a 
version of this program with educational certificates corresponding to the CA functional 
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specialties166 through a blend of distant and in-residence instruction. If each segment is 
treated as a graduate certificate program; completing all the segments could result in a 
master’s degree for CA soldiers, active and reserve alike. 
 
Figure 10.  Example week of SSDCO; week 3 of 4167 
4. Challenges to Implementing Certificate Programs  
The limiting factors to implementing a robust and continuing education system in 
the CA career path are time and money. Making the Civil Affairs Pipeline a graduate 
degree-producing program would add an additional eight weeks to the training timeline. 
This eight-week investment in CA officers will provide the joint force a more capable 
asset to align policy, strategy, and operations. The Army and USASOC should consider 
the increased investment in CA human capital in line with the Chairman’s Strategic 
Guidance to the Joint Force to, “enhance the dialogue in operational theaters and across 
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U.S. interagency decision-making processes.”168 Additional cost will be incurred by 
adding a master’s program from a civilian university. The Army expects officers, 
particularly SOF officers, to complete a master’s program during their career or in 
concurrence with intermediate level education.169 CA teams, the initial entry point, are 
the unit of action for CA operations. Injecting education with the qualification course 
allows the military to reap the greatest reward for an education they are likely to pay for 
anyway.170 As the Chairman identifies, “education will serve as a hedge against surprise, 
much as it has during previous interwar periods.” SOCOM 2020 identifies the SOF 
operator of 2020 as an, “expert warrior, regionally grounded, well-educated, 
diplomatically astute and a master of SOF tradecraft.”171 This educational program will 
posture the CA branch to fulfill its role in the SOCOM 2020 strategy. 
F. CONCLUSION 
Whether the CA educational program provides the broad underpinnings of CA 
concepts or a deep dive in a particular subject, such as governance, CA soldiers require 
education, training, and experience to thrive in complex and unstable environments. CA 
training and continued education are the foundation for progressing the capability and 
capacity of the branch. The next chapter proposes an alternate career path that 
emphasizes additional education and regional specialization as a means to progress to 
senior ranks. 
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V. CIVIL AFFAIRS CAREER TRACK 
This chapter discusses alternate career paths focusing on education and 
broadening opportunities to influence decision makers and populations better. Using the 
education model developed in Chapter IV, the chapter explores potential alternate career 
paths that would maximize the use of senior CA officers in a variety of missions, ranging 
from phase zero shaping and influence operations to post-conflict stabilization.  
The chapter begins by describing the existing career path and milestones to the 
rank of colonel. It then proposes an alternative career path that allows time for 
specialized education and more experience in an officer’s area of expertise. The chapter 
then demonstrates how this added education and experience would better serve strategic 
level thinking at the geographic and functional combatant command (COCOM) levels.  
This chapter argues that the current career path for active duty CA officers does 
not capitalize on the experience gained by CA officers in their deployments, nor does it 
offer sufficient training and education to prepare field grade officers and above for the 
broad spectrum of CA missions. CA requires education and broadening opportunities 
outside of the professional military education system and conventional command track to 
better position this force for employment in future military operations. Specifically, CA 
can evolve to embrace and shape persistent engagements in areas of interest to the United 
States while continuing to prepare for future, large-scale stability operations. 
A. CURRENT CIVIL AFFAIRS OFFICER CAREER PATH 
The current career path for CA officers, outlined in DA PAM 600-3, is based 
upon the career model for Army maneuver branches for selection to command a 
battalion, and eventually, a brigade. DA PAM 600-3 identifies unique attributes of the 
CA officer. 
The human dimension is the differentiating factor that separates CA forces 
from all other military organizations. CA forces are people-centric…CA 




delineated boundaries…The unique operational area of CA forces is 
people; the human dimension, the human sensor, force multiplication, and 
ground truth.172 
Currently, the CA operations previously described, only consistently occur at the 
rank of captain in the existing career path, which is the lowest ranking active duty CA 
officer. As CA captains, officers usually have the opportunity to deploy once, sometimes 
twice, in the role of CA team leader; that occurrence is often the full extent of practical 
CA experience for an officer. In CA, like all SOF branches, majors serve as company 
commanders, leading five CA teams with captains serving as team leaders and a CMO 
cell led by another major. Following company command, a CA major, on track for 
promotion, will seek a second key developmental (KD) job as a battalion operation’s 
officer or battalion executive officer. Upon completing one or both of these positions, the 
major is on track for promotion as an Army lieutenant colonel. A board is then convened 
to determine which officers should be considered for a battalion command. Successfully 
completing battalion command is the proven and reliable method to reaching the rank of 
colonel under the current promotion system. CA battalion commanders, in the two active 
duty CA brigades, serve primarily as force providers with the responsibility to man, train, 
and equip CA soldiers for CA operations in support of GCC commanders and the joint 
force. On average, an officer’s timeline allows approximately seven years at the rank of 
major and five years at the rank of lieutenant colonel before promotion to colonel. See 
Figure 11. 
The CA career track to colonel has multiple implications for the conduct of CA at 
the operational and strategic level. First, most officers have not conducted CA operations 
since the rank of captain; instead, they have been consumed with the duties and 
responsibilities of the force provider. Second, to ensure promotion, the officers have little 
time to pursue additional civilian education outside of professional military education or 
develop foreign language fluency. Third, despite having studied a geographic area of  
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specialty, the opportunity for CA officers to spend time in their foreign area of expertise 
through a broadening assignment, conflicts with the timeline for professional 
advancement. 
 
Figure 11.  CA Career Model from DA PAM 600-3173 
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Figure 12.  Proposed CA Career Model for future DA PAM 600-3174 
Snider argues that the CA officer’s career path is emblematic of a wider problem 
within the U.S. Army, specifically that the Army’s human resources practices have 
created an incentive structure in which Army officers are rewarded for following the 
traditional, force provider career path instead of mastering their assigned occupational 
specialty.175 A force provider trains and equips the operating core of the military in 
support of the mission of the branch. However, for CA professionals to engage and 
operate in their military specialty, additional education, enhanced language abilities, and 
professional experience would greatly increase the capacity of these soldiers to plan, lead, 
and conduct strategic level operations. Furthermore, no incentive exists for soldiers to 
complete advanced degrees. For officers, a master’s degree is expected at the senior 
ranks; however, the quality of that degree is not scrutinized; an online degree is largely 
equal to a degree from a top tier institution. Potentially, officers who took time out of 
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their career to complete a degree may be at a disadvantage to officers who conducted 
their education online while completing key and developmental jobs towards career 
advancement.  
The traditional career track produces proficient military officers familiar with 
traditional Army tasks; however, the current system places smaller or more specialized 
career fields at a disadvantage when compared to the larger and more traditional Army 
branches. Additionally, it does not foster regional or occupational expertise that could be 
leveraged at the lieutenant colonel or colonel grades to serve effectively as CA advisors 
to Army Service Component Commands (ASCCs) or GCC commanders.  
B. CIVIL AFFAIRS OPPORTUNITIES FOR PROMOTION 
CA branch has a similar number of total authorized billets to SF branch.176 
According to the Army’s 2014 Updated Authorization Document, CA has 26 more 
authorizations at the rank of captain and one more authorization at the rank of major than 
does the SF branch. These authorizations correspond largely to fulfilling the requirement 
for tactical level CA. At the operational and strategic level, SF have 100 more lieutenant 
colonel and 50 more colonel authorizations than does CA.177 The limited number of 
lieutenant colonel and colonel billets reduces the inclusion of senior CA officers at the 
divisions and corps, the ASCCs, the theater special operations commands (TSOCs) and 
the GCCs. For example, six reserve CA coded billets are located at United States Pacific 
Command (USPACOM); one colonel and two lieutenant colonels in the J91, the 
interagency staff section, and one major and two sergeants first class in the J564, the 
theater security cooperation management section.178 No active duty CA coded billets are 
located at USPACOM.179 See Figure 13. 
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Figure 13.  Comparison of Special Forces and Civil Affairs Authorizations 
Other Army branches use limited authorizations at the lieutenant colonel and 
colonel ranks to justify filling branch immaterial or operations branch immaterial 
positions, O1A and O2A coded billets, respectively.180 However, for SOF branches, like 
CA, the Department of the Army issued Executive Order 042-11, which allows Army 
Human Resources Command not to assign SOF personnel to O1A and O2A jobs due to 
the increase in SOF demand worldwide.181 For CA, these relatively small numbers result 
in an underrepresentation at the operational and strategic level of operations and 
planning, a diminished opportunity to attend the senior service colleges, and ultimately, a 
limited career path for CA officers.  
C. AN ALTERNATE CIVIL AFFAIRS CAREER MODEL 
A CA officer, capable of persistent engagement and long-term operations, with a 
functional specialty, can be developed within active CA through education and 
experience.182 Individuals electing to follow such a path would be similar in concept to 
the CA governance specialist concept, introduced in Chapter IV, beginning as an active 
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duty CA generalist, and then, specializing in a particular AOR and functional area 
corresponding with the CA functional specialties.183 After promotion to major, and 
potentially after company command, a CA officer would pursue additional education or 
credentialing to be considered a specialist in the field. For governance specialists, it could 
mean a master’s degree in public administration; for an engineer specializing in 
infrastructure, it could result in a master’s degree in civil engineering or a professional 
engineers license. This career path allows officers to build upon their undergraduate 
degrees or self-interest, within the CA functional specialties, to determine a field of study 
and specialization that could result in greater expertise and the ability to advise at the 
strategic level and better support military engagement as part of wider U.S. foreign policy 
objectives.  
In addition to pursing higher education specific to CA expertise, this knowledge 
could be further bolstered by a 12-month internship that provides practical experience in 
the profession, as well as a geographical area of specialization. For example, a 
governance specialist could seek a position with the USAID Regional Development 
Mission in a specific geographic area, while an engineer could seek a position with the 
U.S. Army Corps of Engineers or Naval Facilities Engineer Command in the assigned 
AOR. Alternatively, a CA officer could temporarily augment an Office of Defense 
Cooperation, Security Assistance or Joint U.S. Military Assistance Group; these 
experiences would provide developing CA specialists an opportunity to blend their 
civilian expertise and military profession. Furthermore, these assignments would allow 
CA officers the opportunity to gain additional experience in their specialty professions 
and build a professional network of peers while enhancing their cultural understanding 
and foreign language proficiency in their area of focus. Additional options for internships 
exist at international organizations, such as the regional UN Humanitarian Civil Military 
Coordination offices, the Hague Academy of Local Governance, attendance at foreign 
command and general staff colleges or a tour with the Ministry of Defense Advisors 
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Program. Following education and a practical internship, officers would be assigned to 
ASCCs, the TSOCs or the GCCs.  
Finally, the trained, educated, and experienced CA officers at strategic level 
commands would assist leaders in synchronizing theater, regional, and country objectives 
through operations, planning, and exercises. The CA specialists could further work in 
conjunction with the foreign area officers who shape the country-level military 
relationships. CA officers also could tailor engagements and objectives to influence or 
shape targeted populations, local governments, or empower indigenous military units to 
support and assist local civil authorities. This course of action creates a corps of regional 
specialists with functional skills, operating as staff members in theater-level elements, 
who are available to support CA operations and achieve military objectives in the theater. 
Implementing this new career path faces several important challenges. First, in the 
current professional model, additional education and internships outside the force 
negatively affect an officer’s professional timeline. To address this issue and to maintain 
a regional specialization, key and developmental jobs for CA specialists would have to be 
adopted by the Army in DA PAM 600-3, “Commissioned Officer Professional 
Development and Career Management,” to reflect professional development in 
regionally-specific CA positions within theater-level operations, planning, and exercise 
staff sections.  
Second, the primary staff functions at the GCC and ASCC could be added to the 
centralized selection list or CSL. Ensuring qualified and experienced regional specialists 
were correctly assigned to these senior positions would demonstrate professional parity 
with the command-tracked CA officers while certifying the appropriate officers are 
assigned to these critical billets. Military intelligence (MI) branch specifies a similar 
career track, which designates a number of intelligence jobs as key and developmental at 
the major level. At the rank of lieutenant colonel, MI assigns two positions from a CSL, a 
MI battalion command, as well as the division intelligence officer (G-2).184 The MI track 
sets a precedence from which CA could designate the GCC and ASCC CA positions as 
                                                 
184 Headquarters, Department of the Army, Pamphlet 600-3, Commissioned Officer Professional 
Development and Career Management, 244. 
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CSL colonel billets while the senior CA officer at the TSOC could be a CSL lieutenant 
colonel. Furthermore, professional development credit could be given to officers selected 
for doctoral-level degrees to return and teach at the CAQC as part of their utilization to 
the branch. This career path culminates with an experienced, educated, and effective CA 
colonel serving as the primary advisory to the GCC commander and his staff while 
synchronizing CA operations across the theater. See Figure 14. 
 
Figure 14.  Sample Career Models for CA Specialists 
D. OPTIONS OUTSIDE OF CIVIL AFFAIRS 
Based on current authorizations, CA has a limited trajectory of advancement for a 
majority of officers. According to the 2014 personnel authorizations for CA, the 
authorizations are for 575 captains, 272 majors, 84 lieutenant colonels, and only 14 
colonels.185 To increase opportunities for CA further, another career path could be 
developed that employs qualified and experienced officers in other Army functional 
                                                 
185 Headquarters, Department of the Army, Deputy Chief of Staff G-1, Directorate of Military 
Personnel Management, Updated Authorization Document. 
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areas, such as foreign area officer or strategist; both these career fields have larger 
authorizations at the lieutenant colonel and colonel grade than CA.  
E. CONCLUSION 
The current career progression model does not appropriately prepare CA officers 
to plan, lead, and conduct CA operations at the operational and strategic level. An 
atmosphere, within the branch, of lifelong learning, additional education, and greater 
experience is required to bridge the cognitive strata between tactical, operational, and 
strategic level thought. Using the CA functional specialties to focus the active duty CA 
officer’s education would empower CA officers to tailor their interests to professional 
endeavors for employment at the theater and regional level combatant commands. CA 
officers assigned in the operations, plans, and exercise directorates at the GCC, TSOC 
and ASCC would be best positioned to focus military engagements, large-scale exercises, 
and joint combined exchange trainings to best affect targeted populations, military units, 




Despite CA’s significant achievements in stabilizing conflict settings from World 
War II to the present, CA has experienced intermittent support in preparing the force for 
future conflicts. After the Korean War, the DOD hired the Operations Research Office of 
Johns Hopkins University to study CA in Korea. The authors of the study provided 
recommendations that are as true today as they were in 1951.  
The Army should take steps to find adequate numbers of qualified officers 
and teach them the substance of Civil Affairs. This recommendation 
involves consideration of the development of criteria for the selection of 
CA officers, of the establishment of a career pattern, training in both 
military and political subjects, and of training both in the close support of 
tactical operations and rear area support of the operations of large units 
and commands.186  
This capstone has outlined the historical training and employment of CA forces, 
examined methods of influence, summarized current CA training, and proposed a new 
career progression track for the CA officer. Based on the contemporary and future 
missions of CA, this project proposes additional education and advanced training as the 
foundation for more effective CA officers. Finally, this capstone proposes a further 
evolution of CA in line with U.S. Army Special Operations Command’s ARSOF 2022 
strategy, specifically developing capabilities to influence target groups in phase zero 
shaping operations. 
The capstone concludes with the following observations and recommendations. 
First, maximizing the influence and effectiveness of CA forces requires an investment in 
human capital. As stated in ARSOF 2022, empowering the force through enhanced 
education and training, as well as developing new approaches to immersive education 
and professional experiences culturally, will enhance the capability to conduct effective 
and nuanced influence activities.187 These steps will lead toward optimizing the 
relationship between special operations and conventional forces with joint, interagency, 
                                                 
186 Stolzenbach and Kissinger, Civil Affairs in Korea 1950–1951, Johns Hopkins University, 2. 
187 United States Army John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School, Office of Strategic 
Communication, ARSOF 2022, 18. 
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intergovernmental, and multinational actors through habitual interdependence. By 
assigning qualified and culturally educated officers to regional combatant commands, CA 
will be positioned to nest the efforts of SOF, Army regionally-aligned forces, and the 
interagency, while providing options for policy makers.188  
Second, regionally astute CA officers at the operational and strategic levels will 
best provide continuous and proactive support to deployed forces poised to provide 
tailored capabilities in support of national-level influence operations and strategy.189 To 
achieve these ends, this capstone proposes an alternate career model for CA officers to 
receive additional education and advanced military planning courses to integrate CA 
operations into operations and planning at the operational and strategic-level commands. 
Assigning CA officers to joint, Army, interagency and SOF operational headquarters will 
enhance the campaign planning capability of the staff while providing these commands 
with the Army’s stability and CMO experts focused on the human domain.190 Through 
education, experience, and proper employment, future CA officers will contribute 
directly and develop positions of influence in critical nexuses of U.S. policy, 
determination, and force projection. 
Finally, education at the CA qualification course needs to include a greater 
emphasis on influence building and critical thinking skills to supplement the existing 
training. Graduate-level courses on the fundamentals of rule of law, economics, and 
social sciences with a focus on governance would better prepare CA officers for the 
complex and unstable environment to which they will deploy. In addition to the 
foundational education and training at the CAQC, advanced CA courses are required to 
develop tactical CA operators into special operations campaign planners and ARSOF 
operational artists. A curriculum that embodies this approach is included in the Appendix. 
                                                 
188 United States Army John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School, Office of Strategic 
Communication, ARSOF 2022, 21. 
189 Ibid. 
190 Ibid., 22. 
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A. OBSTACLES TO IMPLEMENTING THE NEW WAY AHEAD AND 
ADDITIONAL RESEARCH 
The proposed alternate career path emphasizing additional education and 
experience does not come without obstacles to implementation. Such challenges include 
time, money, and the natural resistance to change. A significant amount of time will be 
required in the new officer career model to allow for educational growth and 
opportunities for additional experience. Rather than considered as time outside of the 
operational force, time spent on education and experience should be understood as an 
investment in CA operators to gain experience and expertise in their geographic region. 
Additionally, time spent for education and professional internships will incur additional 
duty service obligations to ensure that the U.S. Army and the branch receive an adequate 
return on investment. 
As the Army enters an ever more fiscally constrained environment, securing 
funding for additional education will be increasingly difficult. Therefore, only a limited 
number of officers will be able to benefit from advanced education and experience. A 
DOD Program Objective Memorandum, along with the programming, budgeting, and 
execution process, would be required to institutionalize these requirements as a multi-
year program for CA officers. In other words, the process of making this new career 
trajectory the standard path for CA officers will require a long-term financial 
commitment on the part of the U.S. Army, the DOD, and U.S. Congress; securing this 
support is no small challenge. 
Additionally, an alternate career path will not come without risk to promotion and 
career progression. The regional specialization career track will need to be carefully 
mapped out, in the DA PAM 600-3, to ensure officers do not get punished for missing the 
traditional milestones for promotion and the new markers are recognized as necessary. 
Establishing career progression milestones like those proposed in this capstone most 
likely will require a transition period during which both the new and old milestones are 
recognized; undoubtedly, it will be a messy process. 
Finally, this capstone would like to conclude with suggested areas for additional 
research. First, a thorough study of an alternate career path within the Army’s Human 
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Resources Command infrastructure, including incentives and qualifications, is necessary 
to implement these proposed changes. An in-depth analysis would be required to 
maximize the return on investment in education and experience toward professional goals 
and influence. Alongside this study, a thorough review and fast-track revision of the DA 
PAM 600–3 is necessary to ensure alternate career path milestones are given full 
professional development credit for promotion and potential and career progression. 
Second, a study of potential CA billets at the COCOM level would help identify 
existing positions for CA officers to advise at the strategic level, and areas that need CA 
but do not have the prescribed billets. Creating new billets in a fiscally austere 
environment is unlikely; therefore, CA positions at the COCOM level would most likely 
need to be taken from other billets. This process can be controversial but well worth the 
investment in reallocation.  
 71 
APPENDIX. SPECIAL WARFARE ADVANCED ANALYSIS AND 
TARGETING COURSE  
The SWAATC is designed to enhance ARSOF operators’ abilities to research, 
analyze, target, and plan activities to build, degrade, mitigate, influence, or exploit critical 
factors of state, counter-state, and neutral actors. The course is a collaborative effort of 
instruction between CA, SF, and MI for ARSOF regiments. The intent of the course is to 
teach operational planning for TSOC Level II strategic special warfare campaign plans in 
support of GCC and U.S. embassy country plans through CA, SF, and Psychological 
Operations inputs with an emphasis on human targeting at the macro level. See Figure 16. 
SWAATC trains senior ARSOF captains, as well as serving as a prerequisite for the 
special warfare operational design course (SWODC). Figure 15 shows where the 
SWAATC fits into the professional military education (PME) for a Civil CA officer. This 
course does not replace the need for additional education, but serves as part of the 




Figure 15.  ARSOF Professional Education Model191 
The course consists of four specific modules: joint planning, ID management, 
advanced special operations training, and CA targeting framework. See Figure 16. 
                                                 
191 United States Army John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School, Special Warfare 
Advanced Analysis and Targeting Decision Brief, briefing slides (Fort Bragg, NC: United States Army 
John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School, 2014), Slide 5. 
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Figure 16.  SWAATC by Module 
 MOD A- Joint 
Planning 
Instructed by: B/3/1 
TLO: Enhance the 
ARSOF operator's 






in order to develop 
plans and programs 
to influence and 
leverage the human 
domain across the 
spectrum of Special 
Warfare.  
MOD B- ID 
Management 
Instructed by: B/6/1 
TLO: Enhance the 
ARSOF operator's 
ability to conduct 
open source research 
and mitigate risk of 
cyber surveillance by 
providing cyber 
skills training and 
database research 
techniques.  
MOD C- ASOT 
Instructed by: A/6/1 




Techniques (Level 1) 
in order to enhance 
their capacity to 
provide CA/PO 
inputs into ASO as 
an operational 
control element in 
support of US 
ambassadors and 
other agencies as 
directed. 
MOD D- CATF 
Instructed by: B/3/1 
TLO: Enhance the 
ARSOF operator's 
ability to research, 
analyze, target, and 
plan activities to 
build, degrade, 
mitigate, influence, 
or exploit critical 
factors of state, 
counter-state, and 
neutral actors. 
USEMB plan ISO TSOC Level II Strategic UW Campaign 
Plan with CA/SF/PO inputs with an emphasis on human 
targeting at the macro level.  
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A detailed outline of the course requirements is displayed in Figure 17. 
 
Figure 17.  Proposed SWAATC Course Schedule192 
                                                 
192 United States Army John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School, Special Warfare 
Advanced Analysis and Targeting Decision Brief, Slide 7. 
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